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Population censuses in societies that are deeply divided  
along ethnic, religious or linguistic lines can be sensitive affairs  
– particularly where political settlements seek to maintain peace 
through the proportional sharing of power between groups.  
This brief sets out some key findings from a research project 
investigating the relationship between census politics and  
the design of political institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kenya, Lebanon and Northern Ireland.
Census politics in deeply 
divided societies
Laurence Cooley
Concerned about the dominance of ethnicity  
in Bosnian politics, a number of civil society 
groups subsequently lobbied for the questions 
to be made more open in format, to make it 
simpler for people to reject ethnic identification 
and be counted simply as ‘Bosnians’ instead 
(Perry, 2013). Their success in having the 
questionnaire redesigned was in large part 
thanks to the presence of an International 
Monitoring Operation, established to ensure 
compliance of the census with international  
and European standards.
Lobbying of government to influence census 
design also occurred in Kenya prior to its 2009 
census, when representatives of some smaller 
and sub-groups threatened to boycott the 
census should they not be listed amongst  
the possible responses to the tribe question, 
rather than being subsumed into larger tribes  
or an ‘other’ option (Balaton-Chrimes, 2011). 
Demands such as these are motivated not  
only by the perception or reality that power  
and resources often flow from being 
In order to better understand the nature of 
census politics in deeply divided societies,  
the project breaks down the census process 
into three phases: the decision to hold a 
census and the design and preparation of the 
questionnaire; the process of enumeration; and 
the processing, publication and use of census 
results. Each of these phases is characterised 
by interaction between the state, civil society 
and international actors and standards.
Planning the census
One of the most contentious aspects of census 
design concerns decisions about whether and 
how to ask people about their ethnic identities, 
religion and language spoken. When Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’s 2013 census was being 
planned, the first draft of the questionnaire 
featured ‘closed’ tick-box responses to 
questions about ethnicity, religion and 
language, and these appeared to encourage 
respondents to identify with the country’s three 
main groups – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.
The contentious  
politics of the census  
in consociational 
democracies
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categorised by the census, but also a powerful 
sense that such categorisation confers 
symbolic recognition on group identities.
In the Lebanese case, by contrast, the  
link between group size and political 
representation has meant that no census  
has been undertaken since 1932. Lebanon’s 
political system is based on a particularly rigid 
form of ‘consociationalism’, which is a form  
of power sharing also employed in different 
guises in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern 
Ireland. Lebanon’s system of consociational 
power sharing, dating back to 1943, operates 
on the basis of each religious community 
having a fixed quota of representatives in 
parliament. While the quotas were revised 
somewhat by the 1989 Taif Agreement, they 
remain based essentially on the population 
shares from the 1932 census (Faour, 2007).
While Lebanon’s religious demography has 
changed significantly since 1932, the revisions 
to the power-sharing formula that a new 
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population count would entail mean that there 
are today no serious calls for a census to be 
held. Christian parties would undoubtedly lose 
from any revision of the quota system,  
and while Shia and Sunni parties would gain, 
the complexities of inter-group relations and 
coalitions have kept the census off the political 
agenda, however useful census data might be 
for planning and development purposes.
Enumeration
Once the census has been designed and 
planned, its most visible phase is the process 
of enumeration, in which members of a 
population are either visited by enumerators  
or complete census forms themselves. In the 
Bosnian case of 2013, the lead-up to the 
enumeration was characterised by campaigns 
associated with each of the country’s three 
main ethnic groups, which sought to encourage 
their members to answer the questions on 
ethnic identity, religion and language in a way 
that identified them clearly as either Bosniak, 
Serb or Croat (Perry, 2013).
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s system of 
consociationalism guarantees ethnic 
representation for these three groups, and 
campaigners were motivated in part by a  
desire to maximise their share of the population 
statistics, in order to ensure their continued 
guaranteed representation. Some campaigners 
went as far as to encourage Bosnians living 
overseas to return to the country temporarily  
so that they would be included in the count. 
Rumours circulated amongst the diaspora  
that they stood to lose property rights in their 
home country if they were not enumerated  
in the census.
The Bosniak, Serb and Croat ethnic campaigns 
also faced a rival, ‘civic’ campaign, however, 
which encouraged people to reject ethnic 
identification, and in so doing tried to use the 
census as an opportunity to demonstrate that 
many citizens felt unrepresented by ethnic 
parties. Some members of this civic campaign 
encouraged people to identify as simply 
‘Bosnian’ in the census as one way of 
generating pressure to liberalise the country’s 
power-sharing institutions by opening them  
up to those who do not identify politically as 
Bosniak, Serb or Croat.
Northern Ireland, by contrast, has not 
witnessed campaigns to influence census 
respondents’ religious identification, despite 
the significance of its political divide. In large 
part, this is likely because power sharing takes 
a more liberal form in Northern Ireland than in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rather than 
pre-determining which groups are represented 
in political institutions, the Good Friday 
Agreement established a system of power 
sharing that leaves the groups to be 
represented in the executive to the electoral 
system, which improves the prospects for 
non-ethnic parties (McCulloch, 2014, p. 70). 
As a result, there is less to be gained in relation 
to political representation from maximising a 
group’s share in recorded population statistics 
in comparison with a case such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where seats on the country’s 
tripartite presidency, for example, are reserved 
for a Bosniak, a Serb and a Croat.
Census results
Whereas census results might not matter in 
determining political representation in Northern 
Ireland in the way that they do in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or Lebanon, census results have 
been used to explain the outcome of recent 
elections to its power-sharing institutions. 
Following the 2017 Northern Ireland Assembly 
elections, which were the first in which unionist 
parties had not won a majority, local media 
revisited the census results in order to explain 
this outcome by reference to the shifting 
demographic balance of Northern Ireland, 
which has seen the Catholic minority slowly 
grow to almost match the Protestant 
population.
The main public debate about census results  
in Northern Ireland, however, has concerned 
the implications of the figures on religious 
affiliation for its constitutional status,  
with discussion often underpinned by an 
assumption that if and when a Catholic  
majority emerges, then Irish unification is likely 
to follow (Anderson and Shuttleworth, 1998). 
While this debate is not a new one – the 
borders of Northern Ireland on its establishment 
were based on the 1911 census results –  
the provision in the Good Friday Agreement  
for the holding of a ‘border poll’ has arguably 
increased the salience of census results –  
as has the debate about the implications  
of Brexit for Northern Ireland.
In other cases, disputes have resulted in the 
rejection of census results by some groups.  
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, 
politicians and the statistics office in the 
Republika Srpska federal entity have refused to 
accept the results published by the central 
statistics agency, arguing that the figures  
were inflated by people who were persuaded  
to return to the country to be enumerated by  
the campaigns that accompanied the census.  
While the International Monitoring Operation 
recognises the published results, which confers 
international recognition on them, the Republika 
Srpska government has published  
its own results, and it seems unlikely that this 
dispute between the entity and the central  
state will be resolved (Rose, 2016).
Disputes over census results have also 
occurred in Kenya. Kenya lacks the formal, 
institutionalised features of power sharing 
found in the other three cases included in  
this project, but an important aspect of the 
country’s 2010 constitution has been a 
process of decentralisation. This has placed 
greater emphasis on the relative populations  
of the country’s 47 counties, with a proposed 
revenue-sharing formula giving greatest weight 
to the population of each county in determining 
its allocation of resources. Because of disputes 
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over the results of the 2009 census, which 
some argue was manipulated in some  
regions, politicians have argued that  
it is necessary to wait for the 2019 census to 
be completed for revenue to be shared fairly 
(Wainaina, 2019).
Implications for policy
The implications of the design of political 
institutions such as power-sharing 
arrangements for the ability to conduct a 
census are never likely to be central to the 
negotiation of those institutions, particularly 
where they are adopted as part of peace 
agreements. Nonetheless, the ability to  
conduct a census is important in post-conflict 
or otherwise divided societies. Not only does  
the census provide data that is important for 
post-conflict reconstruction and development, 
but it also provides the ‘backbone’ of the 
broader statistical system, allowing for the 
construction of a robust sample frame for 
important surveys. It is therefore necessary to 
consider how some of the difficulties of 
conducting a census in these contexts  
might be mitigated.
As the Lebanese case illustrates, a power-
sharing system that relies on rigid quotas 
derived from population shares is likely to make 
the holding of a regular census particularly 
challenging. More liberal power-sharing 
systems are likely to pose fewer difficulties, 
since they do not institutionalise such a strong 
link between population shares and political 
representation. While quotas might be a 
necessary element of an agreement to end 
violent conflict in some contexts, thought needs 
to go into how they might be updated to reflect 
demographic shifts over time. One way to do 
this would be to include provision in the initial 
power-sharing agreement for revising the 
quotas in light of census results. Should that not 
be possible, an alternative might be to separate 
political representation from population shares 
by agreeing that future censuses should not 
include questions about ethnic or religious 
identities. While this might mean that quotas  
fail to keep up with changing demographics,  
as has been the case in Lebanon, it would at 
least allow for the collection of much-needed 
socio-economic data.
The Bosnian case, meanwhile, demonstrates 
the importance of international monitoring of 
censuses where they are likely to be disputed. 
While the 2013 Bosnian census was certainly 
not problem-free, the presence of an 
International Monitoring Operation did smooth 
the process of holding the country’s first 
post-war population count. In particular,  
the IMO played an important role in mediating 
between civil society, politicians and 
statisticians in disputes about the design of  
the questionnaire. Such operations can help 
civil society hold governments to international 
standards of census design, and are also 
potentially important actors in monitoring the 
enumeration process. In cases where 
accusations of the manipulation or fabrication 
of census results have been made, such as 
with Kenya’s 2009 exercise, international 
monitors can potentially play a role similar to 
that of the well-established function of 
electoral observers.
Governments and their statistics agencies, 
supported by international organisations where 
necessary, can also do more to inform their 
citizens about the implications and importance 
of the census. In the Bosnian case, for example, 
the official census publicity was drowned out 
by the ethnic campaigns, and rumours 
including those about the link between census 
enumeration and property rights circulated 
largely unchallenged. Clearer and more 
prominent official communication can also  
help individuals and civil society organisations 
to spot and report irregularities with the census 
process, which in turn is likely to increase  
the reliability of results and to improve public 
confidence in them.
Finally, while comparative research might  
be able to help us identify ways to reduce 
contestation around the census, a key insight 
that the project draws from the wider literature 
is that it is important not to pathologise 
post-conflict or deeply divided societies. 
Because they are linked to questions of who 
gets what, when and how – Harold Lasswell’s 
definition of politics – censuses are always  
and everywhere political exercises, not just 
where they are linked to representation of 
ethnic groups in conflict.
4 Research Brief | January 2019
1
8
8
0
4
  ©
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
irm
in
gh
am
 2
0
1
9
. P
rin
te
d 
on
 a
 r
ec
yc
le
d 
gr
ad
e 
pa
pe
r 
co
nt
ai
ni
ng
 1
0
0
%
 p
os
t-
co
ns
um
er
 w
as
te
.
Contact us
International Development Department
School of Government and Society
College of Social Sciences
University of Birmingham
Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT
United Kingdom
Email: idd@bham.ac.uk
Tel: +44 (0)121 415 8625
Twitter: @iddbirmingham
www.birmingham.ac.uk/idd
About the author
Dr Laurence Cooley is a Research Fellow in the International 
Development Department at the University of Birmingham and a 
Visiting Research Fellow in the School of Natural and Built 
Environment at Queen’s University Belfast. His current research is 
funded by the Economic and Social Research Council’s Future 
Research Leaders scheme. His research interests include the 
design of conflict management institutions, the politics of the census 
and the governance of sport in deeply divided societies.
Email: l.p.cooley@bham.ac.uk
Twitter: @laurence_cooley
References
Anderson, J. and Shuttleworth, I. (1998) ‘Sectarian demography, 
territoriality and political development in Northern Ireland’,  
Political Geography 17(2), pp. 187–208, DOI:  
10.1016/S0962-6298(97)00035-8
Balaton-Chrimes, S. (2011) ‘Counting as citizens: Recognition  
of the Nubians in the 2009 Kenyan census’, Ethnopolitics 10(2),  
pp. 205–18, DOI: 10.1080/17449057.2011.570983
Faour, M.A. (2007) ‘Religion, demography, and politics in Lebanon’, 
Middle Eastern Studies 43(6), pp. 909–21, DOI: 
10.1080/00263200701568279
McCulloch, A. (2014) Power-Sharing and Political Stability in  
Deeply Divided Societies, London: Routledge
Perry, V. (2013) ‘The 2013 census in Bosnia and Herzegovina –  
A basic review’, Democratization Policy Council, October,  
available at: www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/
dpcpolicynotebihnewseries3bihcensus.pdf
Rose, E. (2016) ‘Bosnian Serbs dismiss monitors’ approval of census’, 
Balkan Insight, 13 October, available at: www.balkaninsight.com/en/
article/valid-bosnian-census-still-disputed-by-serbs-10-12-2016
Wainaina, E. (2019) ‘Revenue sharing scheme shapes census debate’, 
Daily Nation, 6 January, available at: www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/
Revenue-sharing-scheme-shapes-census-debate/1064-4922790-
a9ei66/index.html
Project outputs
Cooley, L. (forthcoming) ‘To be a Bosniak or to be a citizen? 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 2013 census as an election’, 
Nations and Nationalism, DOI: 10.1111/nana.12500
Cooley, L. (2018) ‘A political count: Looking ahead to the 2021 
census’, Northern Slant, 5 July, available at: www.northernslant.
com/a-political-count-looking-ahead-to-the-2021-census/
Cooley, L. (2018) ‘Keeping politics out of the census is much 
harder than it sounds’, The Conversation, 4 April, available at: 
https://theconversation.com/keeping-politics-out-of-the-census-is-
much-harder-than-it-sounds-91991
Cooley, L. (2016) ‘The politics of the census in consociational 
democracies’, IDD Blog, 12 September, available at: 
https://blog.bham.ac.uk/idd/2016/09/the-politics-of-the-census-in-
consociational-democracies/
Cooley, L. and Mujanović, J. (2016) ‘Population politics in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina: A reply to Bochsler and Schläpfer’, Ethnopolitics 
15(5), pp. 487–92, DOI: 10.1080/17449057.2016.1190159
Future publications from the project will be listed at 
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES/N01684X/1.
About IDD
The University of Birmingham’s International Development Department (IDD) is a multidisciplinary 
department committed to poverty reduction through the development of effective governance 
systems. IDD’s strength lies in the breadth of its interests and its position between the worlds of 
practice and ideas. Our research links with our consultancy work, informs the education and training 
offered and contributes to academic and practitioner debates about development policy. IDD is part 
of the School of Government and Society, which is one of the leading UK and international centres  
for politics, international relations, international development, and European studies.
Designed and printed by Edgbaston, Birmingham, 
B15 2TT, United Kingdom
www.birmingham.ac.uk
